The final report of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Board of
Inquiry (BOI) organised to investigate the 25th January 2015 massacre of
44 Special Action Force (SAF) police officers is now available and can
be downloaded from the official PNP website here*.
The massacre transpired in the midst of the execution of “Oplan” Exodus
which aimed to “neutralize high value targets (HVTs)” consisting of
international terrorists wanted by the United States’ Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
A
notable caveat in the report is that investigators “failed to secure an
interview” with key figures in the chain of command, notably Philippine
President Benigno Simeon ‘BS’ Aquino III, suspended Philippine National
Police (PNP) chief Alan Purisima, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Chief of Staff Gregorio Catapang. The report also stated that “All
concerned officers of the AFP refused to be interviewed by the BOI
despite repeated requests.” The report also highlighted that the AFP and
Purisima refused to subject cellular phones used during the operation
for making calls and sending and receiving text messages to forensic
examination by the BOI.
The report clearly states that Oplan Exodus was
(1) Approved by President BS Aquino;
(2) Implemented by then suspended PNP chief Alan Purisima and SAF Director Getulio Napenas; and,
(3) Excluded PNP Officer-in-Charge Leonardo Espina.
Evidence showed that President BS Aquino knew full well that the
suspended Purisima was participating in the operation. The report,
however, noted that back on the 16th December 2014, Espina had issued
Special Order No. 9851 directing Purisima to “cease and desist” from
involving themselves in any PNP operations. This clearly proves that
Purisima had no business being involved in Oplan Exodus — something
that, according to the report, Napenas also ignored. Napenas and
Purisima were also both identified as being responsible for failing to
(a) inform Department of Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar
Roxas about Oplan Exodus and (b) implement prior coordination with the
AFP.
Napenas had “heavily influenced” input into the planning of Oplan
Exodus which was said to have been undertaken by “a group of officers
and not by a planning team” and that his planning assumptions were
regarded as “unrealistic” by some of his subordinate commanders. The
main aspects of the plan and the thinking that went into it that may
have contributed to the high risk of confusion and failed coordination
include:
(1) A distrust of the AFP’s ability secure vital operational
information from leakage owing to “intermarriages of some AFP personnel
with the local people.”
(2) The “Time on Target” (TOT) approach to coordinating Oplan Exodus
recommended by Napenas to the president wherein elements of the team
were kept on a need-to-know basis up until the target was engaged to
minimise unnnecessarily advanced dissemination of information that could
compromising the operation.
(3) An over-reliance on immediate artillery fire support from the AFP
and the ability to invoke “peace process mechanisms to facilitate
ceasefire” in the event that the SAF teams are exposed to “heavy enemy
fire”.
It seems that the combination of the TOT approach and a shaky Plan B
consisting of AFP artillery and the “peace process” was what proved
fatal to Oplan Exodus. Prior experience reveals that it could take “at
least six hours of negotiation” to achieve a ceasefire — which means
that in the midst of a firefight where even minutes could spell the
difference between life and death for scores of personnel, relying on
ceasefire arrangements as a Plan B was shaky at best. Indeed, the report
revealed that by the time the AFP was informed that Oplan Exodus was in
operation, “a hostile encounter between SAF Commandos and various armed
groups in Mamasapano had already ensued.”
Judging from the accounts described in the report, there was a lot
about the planning surrounding Oplan Exodus that could have been done
better and a lot of unsound assumptions made. The rest of the report
described the on-the-ground circumstances (unfavourable terrain, etc.)
that exacerbated the execution of the shaky plan. Key among the
operational snafus cited was an “ineffective communication system.”
One of the key conclusions in the BOI report was the existence of a violation of the PNP chain of command
which is a fundamental doctrine of the PNP that stipulates that such
“runs upward and downward”. This contradicts an early assertion made by
Department of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima that the chain-of-command
concept does not apply to the PNP.
Ultimately, it was the involvement of Purisima that constituted one
of the more serious violations of policy and procedure — something that
President BS Aquino was clearly responsible for. Purisima was also cited
as having provided “inaccurate information” to the president as Oplan
Exodus played out on the ground. Napenas was tagged as being culpable
for continuing to follow orders from Purisima despite knowing full well
that he was under suspension by order of the Ombudsman. Command
responsibility — also a doctrine that applies fully to the PNP — is at
play making the three key officers on top of Oplan Exodus, President BS
Aquino, Purisima, and Napenas, ultimately accountable for its tragic
outcome.
Read the full report: *http://pnp.gov.ph/portal/images/boimamasapano/boi_final.pdf
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